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Re-reading Creative Evolution, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion 
and the articles in Mind-Energy, among other works, is there any good 
reason to look for a (more or less) Bergsonian approach to the collective 
as such? While it would be of little use to question Bergson on the kind 
of fairly abstract theory of collective norms, decision and powers which 
has developed between his time and our own, his work is replete with 
valuable insights about human motivations which connect individuals to 
social norms and the collective. Should we not, therefore, re-read Bergson 
1. The author has benefited from very useful exchanges on the occasion of the Cambridge 
meeting (“Reassessing Bergson”) and he expresses his gratitude to Matyáš Moravec for 
the organisation. This research has benefited from the CHRONOS partnership project 
on social and normative regulation at FMSH-CEM; the financial support of Groupe 
SMA in this context is gratefully acknowledged. The author has also benefited from 
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne’s research project on “Impact sur l’internormativité 
de l’approche par les parties prenantes,” hosted by the interdisciplinary Corporate Social 
Responsibility group within ISJPS; finally, the last version of the article has been discussed 
in the research group “Normativité environnementale face aux catastrophes climatiques” 
(DYNAMITE LabEx), February 17th, 2021 (the author thanks Antoine Mandel and 
Stéphane Zuber for particularly helpful comments).
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to examine and assess a number of possible directions in social thought, 
relying on important insights which have hitherto been neglected to some 
extent and from which something is still to be learned? This is perhaps 
appropriate, given the centrality and also the lack of clarity of the status of the 
“individual” in social regulation activities nowadays, in which hypothesised 
or desirable individual dispositions (or behavioural tendencies) are often 
derived from ideas or theories about society as a whole.
There is little hope of uncovering radical novelty on the part of Bergson 
himself in this respect; we are well aware today, thanks to recent scholarship,2 
that he owes much to the debates of his time in numerous fields. Turning 
to Bergson is motivated by the fact that we are confronted with many 
challenges which relate to the shift from the individual will to the collective 
or social will. Addressing these challenges may benefit from attention to 
an author who has thought over this transition with particular acuteness. 
Some of our present-day queries about the individual-collective transition 
— such as those which pertain to preference aggregation, rational-choice 
contractarianism, game-theoretic concepts of collective equilibrium, 
etc. — have no exact counterpart in the Bergsonian corpus. However, a 
philosophy is not enclosed in the space delimited by the problems which 
have given the impetus for it, any more than a physical theory remains 
trapped in the empirical records which account for its emergence. New 
problems provide occasions to check the relevance of a philosophical 
architecture on new grounds. This appears to be a possible methodological 
option for a “re-assessment” of Bergson’s philosophy, and it will be taken up 
in what follows, at first in connection with the foundational aspects of the 
regulation of complex social systems, then in the field of collective action.
I. Collective Goals, Human Challenges and the Regulation of Activities
Organisation and the Guidance of Action
Inspired by the economic analysis of incentives, sometimes also by the 
cybernetic paradigm, or else by the cognitivist perspective on the terms 
of choice (as in contemporary “liberal paternalism” and the “nudges” 
methodology), the effort to regulate human activities is usually articulated 
to collective goals. In this respect, we meet formidable problems of collective 
action today. For example, how is our conduct to be reformed in a way that 
best fits the reasonable requirements of a limitation of carbon emissions 
and global warming? How can we limit the growth of perilous inequalities 
2. See Worms 2002.
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in democratic states? How can we combine respect for freedom and 
decent standards of public information? With the purpose of reorienting 
action so that it brings us closer to certain valid collective objectives, we 
usually rely on individual routines, attitudes or preferences which are 
supposed to be more or less stable, hence predictable. Since the results 
depend on each person’s actions, a very modest kind of methodological 
individualism is hardly facultative: one must understand, in one way or 
other, what drives people to make choices — which choices, and why. 
The usual move, then, is to try and encode the individual behaviour and 
choices into postulated individual values or preferences — sometimes 
using vocables such as “utility,” “desire,” “volition,” etc., depending on 
the context and the discipline. Such hypothesised ingredients of personal 
attitudes thus become the data from which we work and are therefore (at 
least methodologically) treated as fixed points.
What is thus presupposed, however, might undergo transformations in 
social life. Whether we deal with routines and stable attitudes which are 
lent to agents, or with preferences which are deemed “given in advance” 
— or else with types of preferences, more or less altruistic ones for example 
— it is not always easy to assimilate the hypotheses that are made with 
the elements of a hypothetical, ahistorical “human nature” which would 
be determined independently of shared human experience and social 
life. On the other hand, how can one take on the tasks of regulating 
complex systems involving human beings, if one makes no assumption 
about what makes people’s attitudes and behaviour somehow predictable? 
To address these questions, we must deal with transformation, with a 
kind of evolution which is inevitably social in its character. Simplifying 
assumptions are useful for modelling and for the analysis of specific 
social mechanisms. Nevertheless, the limits of the associated toolkits for 
the regulation of human systems of interaction are all too obvious in the 
contemporary world. For example, incentive schemes are, quite clearly, 
insufficient tools for the purposeful reformation of human interaction. 
Relying on pre-determined preferences or attitudes as they do, they prove 
unable to accommodate for the influence of ongoing social interaction on 
the personal mindset. As a consequence, incentive-based plans often prove 
unable to meet their objectives.3 A clear limitation of the popular and 
influential incentive-scheme approach to social organisation is its inability 
to make room for the evolving individual judgment about adequate actions. 
3. For a convincing example of field work on this (see Reynaud 2002). 
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Those models which seemingly enable one to manipulate incentives in a 
social system, in order to reach collective goals, really give no clue for that. 
Individual judgment is not confined to the promotion of predetermined 
interest. It can benefit from the experience of interaction. Indeed, it is 
quite plausible to hold, like philosopher Maurice Blondel (Blondel 1893), 
that collective human action is central to the determination of individual 
attitudes and efforts. From this perspective, it would seem that individual 
attitudes co-evolve with human interaction. This opens up the possibility 
that past social experience conditions human attitudes. Here, of course, 
lies the pitfall of the hereditary transmission of acquired characters, ratified 
by Spencer in the days of yore. Naturalistic views of social learning are still 
influential today, although they display new garments, such as learning in 
repeated games, the imitation of behavioural traits and the evolutionary 
selection of the most advantageous among the latter. Bergson’s warning 
in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion is therefore important and still 
relevant today: “a sociology that thinks it is borrowing from biology the 
idea of the inheritance of acquired characters only repeats what it has lent.”4
Bergson stressed that moral progressive steps (acquisitions) are collected 
in ways of life, in institutions, in language.5 As they shape education in a 
continuous way, they can be transmitted through successive generations, 
in habits which thus appear “hereditary.” This kind of explanation is 
potentially relevant for the development of a philosophy of social and 
moral progress, in which the motives for action are not supposed fixed or 
predetermined. Indeed, Bergson is right in emphasising the coextensive 
character of social life and (mutual) education. Looking at this the other 
way round, it must be suspected that those schemes of social organisation 
which rely on hypothesised, pre-existing motivations, and which are put 
to use in order to transform social reality, have a potential for blocking or 
limiting progress in moral awareness. Certainly, this kind of problem plays a 
4. “[…] [u]ne sociologie qui s’imagine emprunter à la biologie l’idée d’une transmission 
héréditaire de l’acquis ne fait que reprendre ce qu’elle avait prêté” (Bergson 2013b, 289).
5. “C’est dans les mœurs, dans les institutions, dans le langage même que se déposent 
les acquisitions morales ; elles se communiquent ensuite par une éducation de tous les 
instants ; ainsi passent de génération en génération des habitudes qu’on finit par croire 
héréditaires” (Bergson 2013b, 289). This is seemingly disharmonious with the occasional 
strong and general remarks, in Bergson’s lectures (or testimonies thereof ), about the 
dangers of overestimating the role of language in human thought — e.g., 16th lecture, 
April 25th, 1902 (Bergson 2019, 110) on the overstated propositions in Locke and Taine. 
See also: 34th and 35th lesson, “Le langage” (Bergson 1990). On language, practical 
attitudes and social groups, see Balzer (1993, esp. ch. 4).
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role in the widespread contemporary dissatisfaction with economic models 
and concepts (which rely on pre-determined preferences), at least when they 
are used as frames for deliberately modified social interaction, education and 
individual guidance in life (see Arnsperger 2005 and Lacroix 2009).
Creativity and the regulation of action
Converting models of social interaction into imperative benchmarks, the 
way we do so often nowadays, has a cost. We risk jeopardising the creative 
potential of social life as such and its continued capacity to let moral 
awareness and judgment flourish. If social life is the occasion for creative 
and continuing education (not just a vehicle for profitable innovation), it 
can hardly be, at the same time, a regulated system in which individuals are 
told how they should reason and act so as to make their own interaction 
predictable and manipulable, thus involuntarily and collectively ensuring 
that an underlying model become effective (or even true) in some way.
Moreover, in contemporary assessments of the predictability of human 
behaviour, preferences (understood as choice-oriented, practical 
dispositions) are seemingly all-important, as evidenced by economic 
and political models. Naturalistic accounts of the origins and nature of 
preferences are important, too, when it comes to giving foundations to 
our beliefs about the predictability of our own behavioural patterns. In this 
respect, some kind of grounding in instincts, natural desires and needs, or 
neural patterns, rather than mere whimsical wishes, is useful at a certain 
level of scientific analysis. In the eyes of Bergson, as Patricia Verdeau 
recalls, “instinct, in most cases, does not give rise to gradually acquired 
dispositions” (Verdeau 2007, 371), in contradiction with the Spencerian 
view of instinct as a product of a gradual evolution.6 
This opposition was crystallised in the protest against the Spencerian 
assimilation of psychological forces to mechanical forces, and this proved 
important in the development of a philosophy of creativity.7 According 
to Bergson, creativity is everywhere, it lies in everything which allows 
intelligence to supplement instinct, as is clear from Creative Evolution 
(chapter 2 “On the Divergent Directions in the Evolution of Life”). 
Intelligence is understood as a pragmatic faculty, and is not confined to 
6. The difference was explained in a letter to C. K. Morgan, dated Nov. 21st,1912 (quoted 
in Verdeau 2007, 371, n.3).
7. For general perspectives about creativity and ethics in contemporary philosophy, 
starting from Whiteheadean explorations (see Henning 2005). 
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speculative knowledge; indeed, instinct and intelligence are described as 
alternative forms of psychic activity, being two different methods of action 
on inert matter.8 In the context of our discussion, an important feature of 
Bergson’s treatment of intelligence in the creative process of evolution is its 
ability to infuse successive, qualitatively distinct processes in the existing 
reality, including the more or less orderly social world.9 Thus, inference is 
incipient invention10 and technological inventions are not just elements to 
be found along the way of progress; rather, they give progress its direction.11 
Novelty, as it emerges in social experience, has potential consequences for 
the way we think about society. The transformational role of education and 
collective learning in society, in particular, makes it difficult to postulate, 
for the sake of thinking about social regulation, the predominance of fixed 
attitudes or preferences which are supposed to be given. Such postulated 
preferences are usually supposed to be housed in a human nature which is 
what it is and determined quite independently of the history and shared 
experience (or hopes) that are the fabric of human social life. Starting from 
Bergsonian premises, this would seem plainly unacceptable. This is not to 
say, however, that the social life of human beings, for all its creativity and 
testimonies of the action of intelligence, escapes natural constraints.
Here we are faced with a somewhat ambiguous Bergsonian heritage, since 
Bergson was the critic of the plasticity lent to instinct, but also the critic of 
the limits of intelligence, given the importance of instinct for the stability 
of social organisation. This was a singular argumentative position. Let us 
mention in this regard The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, in particular 
Chapter 2 on “Static Religion,” about the expression of individuality 
and the preservation of society, with all its constraints. In the proposed 
“biological interpretation” of those two essential traits of man, intelligence 
and sociability, focusing on “perfect” types of association, societies of 
insects are deemed to be immutable and instinct-driven (Bergson 2013b, 
121) while human societies are intelligent and care for substantial choice 
8. “[N]ous voyons dans ces deux formes de l’activité psychique, avant tout, deux 
méthodes différentes d’action sur la matière inerte” (Bergson 2013a, 137).
9. On the complementarity of orderliness and novelty in Bergson’s thought, see Grosz 
(2007).
10. “Sans doute, il y a intelligence partout où il y a inférence  ; mais l’inférence, qui 
consiste en un fléchissement de l’expérience passée dans le sens de l’expérience présente, 
est déjà un commencement d’invention” (Bergson 2013a, 139).
11. “[…] les inventions qui jalonnent la route du progrès en ont aussi tracé la direction” 
(Bergson 2013a, 139). 
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capabilities of the individuals. This contrast paves the way for Bergson’s own 
interpretation of the (Comtian) complementarity of order and progress.12
In Bergson’s philosophy, the relationship between the individual and the 
collective is deeply impacted by the human specificity with respect to 
novelty and progress. As the effort of invention is delegated to the individual, 
the latter combines intelligence (as he or she is the agent of intelligence 
in the human context) with initiative, independence and freedom.13 As 
intelligence has been substituted for instinct, it is no longer possible to 
rely on instinct as such to equilibrate intelligence. This is the principle of 
the quest for a virtuality of instinct or a residual form thereof, drawing 
on imaginary representations, as it surrounds (predominant) intelligence 
which works with representations. Equilibration is indeed required because 
novelty is not the whole of social life; stability is important too.
On this account, we should pay attention to the potential role of 
intelligence as a threat to the continued existence of society. In his 
vivid portrayal of individual initiative as a rival to social discipline, and 
intelligence-inspired individual egoism as threat to social order, Bergson 
deals with the connection of the individual to the collective, and this is 
connected with sociological doctrines of social organisation as well as to 
normative theories of the proper articulation of individual and collective 
claims. What is now called the paradigmatic “problem of collective action” 
is at the heart of Bergson’s analysis of the suggestions of self-serving actions 
at the individual level, while collective interests, embodied in the social 
discipline, are simultaneously at stake.
The combination of individual and collective concerns in utilitarian 
doctrines, for example, is of special interest because utilitarian philosophy 
relies on both the individual interest and the collective perspective on what 
12. “Des deux conditions posées par Comte, ‘ordre’ et ‘progrès,’ l’insecte n’a voulu que 
l’ordre, tandis que c’est le progrès, parfois exclusif de l’ordre et toujours dû à des initiatives 
individuelles, que vise une partie au moins de l’humanité. Ces deux types achevés de la vie 
sociale se font donc pendant et se complètent. Mais on en dirait autant de l’instinct et de 
l’intelligence, qui les caractérisent respectivement. Replacés dans l’évolution de la vie, ils 
apparaissent comme deux activités divergentes et complémentaires” (Bergson 2013b, 122).
13. “[…] l’effort d’invention qui se manifeste dans tout le domaine de la vie par la 
création d’espèces nouvelles a trouvé dans l’humanité seulement le moyen de se continuer 
par des individus auxquels est dévolue alors, avec l’intelligence, la faculté d’initiative, 
l’indépendance, la liberté. Si l’intelligence menace maintenant de rompre sur certains 
points la cohésion sociale, et la société doit subsister, il faut que, sur ces points, il y ait à 
l’intelligence un contrepoids” (Bergson 2013b, 123-124).
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is suitable for the interests of individuals. Hence a tension within “utility,” 
brilliantly developed in The Two Sources in connection with the fact that 
what individuals take interest in cannot be foreign to their connection to 
other people, nor to social concerns. Indeed, the combination of individual 
and collective concerns would prove quite deceptive, on Bergsonian 
premises, if it were reduced to the kind of general calculus of interests that 
is to be found in the historical utilitarian doctrines. The combination really 
depends upon the reality of human relationships in society. Elsewhere, 
Bergson stressed that the main defect of utilitarianism is obscurity, because 
of the complexity of the idea of happiness (by no means a simpler idea than 
the moral good it is supposed to explain). In addition, Bergson contended 
that a precise determination of the principle of utilitarian ethics would 
require its evolution into a morality of sympathy, in which the individual’s 
happiness would coincide with love for others (Bergson 1992, 59-68). If 
we put the pieces together, this would amount to locating the sources of the 
limits of utilitarianism in the real nature of social relationships, in which 
each individual learns to take interest in what happens to the others, and in 
the interplay of their own motivations on the one hand, social concerns on 
the other hand. Moving from the “closed” to the “open” dimension of social 
life in The Two Sources, Bergson is able to portray the open soul but also the 
process through which the soul is opening itself. This involves reason and 
humanity which go “divine” in some way, thanks to the action of the great 
moral characters in human history. This enables the human experience to 
move far beyond the self-esteem of the group, as it is experienced in group 
belonging. The intuition which surrounds the workings of intelligence and 
creative emotion assumes the form of “callings” which operate through 
human history. Of course, this does not nullify the rational transposition 
which allows the expression of moral life to be consistent, precise, principled, 
orderly and amenable to comparisons (Bergson 2013b, 86) but even though 
moral life is expected to be “rational,” it doesn’t find its origin, nor its 
grounding, in pure reason. With respect to the association of the individual 
and the collective, generally speaking, the difficult intellectual task we face 
is to allow for the seriousness of the constraints and limits on “intelligence” 
as Bergson thought of it, even if, at the same time, these constraints rightly 
seem threatening for humanistic thinking about society. This is not without 
consequence for social and political philosophy. Bergson understood that 
social organisation is not fully transparent for human thought. This holds 
even though he was a thinker of progress and active intelligence in social 
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organisation, especially in this type of social organisation (the human one) 
in which progress is delegated to the individual. In this respect, Bergson’s 
philosophy foreshadowed some of the developments of recent decade, 
especially those theories of social organisation which have made full use of 
the concept of “bounded rationality” — to use the phrase which has gained 
popularity ever since the classic contributions by Herbert Simon, among 
other authors, put it to the forefront (Simon 1982). These theories have 
familiarised us with the limits of individual understanding in social contexts, 
or those of the pragmatic exercise of reason (understood as a faculty), and 
they have given these limits a central position in social organisation. As a 
result, the limits of reason as an active faculty — or the constraints to which 
it is subject — are no longer viewed as anomalies or mere defects; rather, 
they stand out as important building blocks of sociality as it is. Let us take 
good notice, however, of the fact that for a very long time, mainstream 
analyses of institutional organisation and those norms which are enacted in 
society have, on the contrary, showcased the transparency (for the human 
mind) of the concepts at work in norm-based social organisation. Isn’t the 
human mind at home in its self-designed world of legal-political concepts? 
This can be doubted after all. In recent times, the main currents of social 
thought have emphasised, beyond the technical constraints, the limits of 
individual consciousness with respect to the understanding of the structure 
of social life and social mechanisms. It must be noted that this is compatible 
with the importance of individual consciousness in social organisation.
Consciousness played a crucial role in Bergson’s portrayal of choice in the 
architecture of social life. At its root, consciousness is associated with choice. 
Bergson, in the Mind-Energy Lectures (first essay), insisted that the most 
vivid parts of the experience of consciousness are only revealed on certain 
occasions, all of which are linked to decision-making; consciousness is 
indeed to be equated with choice in a certain sense.14 In Creative Evolution, 
consciousness is portrayed as the light which is immanent to the area of 
possible actions. It is more precisely located in the interval between action 
14. First essay in Bergson 2009b: “Quels sont, d’autre part, les moments où notre 
conscience atteint le plus de vivacité ? Ne sont-ce pas les moments de crise intérieure, où 
nous hésitons entre deux ou plusieurs partis à prendre, où nous sentons que notre avenir 
sera ce que nous l’aurons fait ? Les variations d’intensité de notre conscience semblent 
donc bien correspondre à la somme plus ou moins considérable de choix ou, si vous 
voulez, de création, que nous distribuons sur notre conduite. Tout porte à croire qu’il en 
est ainsi de la conscience en général. Si conscience signifie mémoire et anticipation, c’est 
que conscience est synonyme de choix” (Bergson 2009b, 11).
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and representation, and this leads to an “arithmetical” formula which 
describes the gap between virtual and real activity. Deliberation without 
effective action allows consciousness to be particularly intense.15 
In slightly more general terms, in continuity with Bergson’s views, should 
we not make more room for the gradually acquired understanding of the 
structure of interactions and choices (not just for learning in the face of 
immediate challenges and opportunities in action)? It seems that this is indeed 
a task for consciousness, deviating from action and its pressing, immediate 
demands. For example, we can think of the necessary understanding of 
the structure of commitments, which plays a role in institutional forms 
of responsibility-taking nowadays. For instance, it appears to be a fairly 
important factor in the “corporate social responsibility” movement, in 
the fair-trade movement, in emerging concepts that relate to corporate 
“mission.” We may also think of the gradually acquired understanding 
of the structure of regulation when the latter uses elaborate forms of 
coordination of intentions (as in the logic of stakeholders), acceptances 
and institutional intelligence. These are important avenues for research. 
Empirical inquiry is important here. The challenges we face, however, are not 
confined to accuracy in the empirical description of complex phenomena. 
When commitment and action are structured by descriptions, norms and 
the connections to institutions (or powers), an interpretative dimension 
must be taken into account. It is then a matter of choice and therefore, if we 
follow Bergson, a matter of consciousness. This gives arguments in favour 
of a non-static, evolutionary view of the constitution of collective action, in 
a certain contrast with an approach that can be said “aggregative.”
II. Bergson’s Intellectual Legacy and the Limits of Our Aggregative 
Paradigm about Collective Action
From the Individual to the Collective
Almost a century after Bergson published his main works, we have become 
accustomed to abstract thinking about the transition from the individual 
15. “Cette inadéquation de l’acte à la représentation est précisément ici ce que nous 
appelons conscience. […] En approfondissant ce point, on trouverait que la conscience est 
la lumière immanente à la zone d’actions possibles ou d’activité virtuelle qui entoure l’action 
effectivement accomplie par l’être vivant. Elle signifie hésitation ou choix. […] De ce point 
de vue, on définirait la conscience de l’être vivant une différence arithmétique entre l’activité 
virtuelle et l’activité réelle. Elle mesure l’écart entre la représentation et l’action” (Bergson 
1992, 59-68). An additional development is the parallel between virtual and real action on 
the one hand, sensation and perception on the other hand — see Bergson (2009a).
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to the collective. The “aggregative” paradigm about this transition is well 
represented by “social choice theory” (or collective choice theory), following 
from the work of Borda and Condorcet, as it has been profoundly reshaped 
in the 20th century by Kenneth Joseph Arrow and other researchers in 
various disciplines (Arrow 1951). This paradigm is useful for the analysis 
of procedures (voting procedures for example). It meets its limits whenever 
deliberation and the process of choice turn out to matter as such.
Indeed, deliberation is a vehicle for creative dimensions in individual and 
social life. It brings gradually awakened consciousness into play, especially 
with respect to the meaning and scope of the criteria of choice. This proves 
essential whenever we must assess their relative importance, or the desirable 
hierarchies to be created between various criteria of different types. Beyond 
explicit or formal deliberation, the meeting points between evolving 
individual attitudes appear to be decisive in the formation of collective 
action, collective judgments, collective statements and other inherently 
“collective” objects. Collective action, however, is partly structured by 
institutions and institutional goals must be invested with stable goals. 
Thus, in the fairly holistic perspective of institutional operations research, 
the ability of institutions to articulate their own goals or values and to 
pursue them rationally can be contrasted with the potential disorderliness 
which might result from shifting preferences (D’Aumale 1968, 21-22). In 
a more individualistic paradigm, however, the quest for the “collective” 
relies on preferences or value judgments that are supposedly “given” in the 
individual layer of reality, even though they can be supposed to be just any 
system of preferences or judgments, provided pairwise comparison formal 
requirements are met: these include exhaustivity (“completeness”) and 
consistency (transitivity or the absence of cycle) in pairwise comparisons. 
This is illustrated by the so-called “multiprofile” mainstream approach 
to collective choice in contemporary social and political theory.16 This 
is a limitation, and we may think that a less abstract perspective on the 
constitution of the collective — like Bergson’s — also has its role to play. In 
16. This (Arrowian) approach has been the object of economist Serge-Christophe Kolm’s 
stern criticism, on account of its supposedly abstract character, which makes it incapable 
of relying on real-world human values and preferences; see (Kolm 1986). See also Kolm’s 
illuminating remarks about the necessity to try and understand evolving preferences 
whose dynamics is correlated with perceptions, personal experience and the inner life — 
(Kolm 1984, 31). These methodological guidelines can be paralleled with the distinctive 
importance given to personal experience in economic and political life (and in the evolution 
of individual judgment) by Thomas Piketty — for an early example, see (Piketty 1995).
130 Bergsoniana N°1 | 2021
this sense, it is possible to stress that Bergson’s social theory gives a transversal 
perspective on the current political and philosophical debate about liberalism 
and the philosophies of “community” which crucially revolve around the 
structure of personal values and choices.17 Axiological dynamics also has a 
hermeneutical side. Indeed, the gradual social elaboration of descriptions 
that structure and guide collective action or collective attitudes must be 
taken into account for both social and moral reasons.18 For example, are 
the 2019 Hong Kong events “troubles” that involve the threat of chaos, or 
even “terrorism,” or should they be described as successive stages in a fight 
for freedom, involving the use of various strategies of legitimate resistance 
to power? Depending on the chosen description, distinct attitudes can 
be expected. International attitudes (supportive of not) depend on such 
descriptions by and large. The same can be said of their evolution in response 
to the acquisition of information, reflection, and the possible refinement of 
value judgments over time. Of course, we can also say (the other way round) 
that the descriptions that are put forward derive from the attitudes we adopt; 
this, however, should not mask the specific impact of descriptions and their 
evolution on the formation of individual attitudes and collective action. 
We would get only a very limited grasp of questions of this kind, should we 
rely on fixed preferences. Moreover, the dynamics of attitudes and values is 
closely associated with interdependence, and the latter reveals itself only if we 
reject the notion of purely “individual” attitudes and values. In institutional 
settings, the interpretation of standards or principles is a guiding force in the 
process. It usually involves a number of non-obvious choices. The difficulty 
of interpretative choices has occasionally provided authority-supportive 
reasons in the past,19 but this problem is often neglected nowadays. This 
causes hermeneutic troubles in social life and political attitudes. For 
example, nothing forces us to interpret tariff rules as constitutive of a “trade 
war.” In the enactment of this kind of rules, we find a strategic dimension 
which can vaguely be reminiscent of war, and there also exist associations of 
ideas between protectionism and distrust on the international scene, due to 
17. See, in the context of a discussion of Bergson’s views about the “open society” (Fritzi 
2002, 247).
18. In contemporary philosophy, Bergson is still a classic source for dual (social and 
moral) thinking about duty. See for example Santos (2012, 225). 
19. For a classic example, see the restitution of the 1710 dialogue by Andrew Michael 
Ramsay, Entretien de Fénelon et de M. de Ramsai (Ramsay, 1723). In Bausset’s narrative of 
the successive events in Ramsay’s life, leading to the Cambrai dialogues, perplexity about 
textual interpretation plays a prominent role (Bausset 1850, 344). 
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significant historical episodes. This being said, a substantial connection is far 
from obvious. If one chooses to accept its reality, the formation of collective 
attitudes towards new customs tariffs is, ab initio, negatively framed: no one 
likes war, no one trusts those who cause it. The collective attitude would be 
different if the interpretation gave priority to autonomous decision-making 
in the national economy, for example.
In Bergson’s writing, the comparison of the artist and the moralist 
(Mind-Energy, first essay) gave him the opportunity to highlight, in the 
structuring of action in society, the dimension of mutual influence. Thus, 
the creativity that manifests itself in the correlation of evolving attitudes to 
one another in society came to the front. Such is the concrete foundation 
of the celebrated Bergsonian model of the propagation of a moral outlook 
in society.20 Bergson wrote about those great men (“gens de bien”) whose 
simple and inventive heroism has opened new routes to virtue. The 
analysis of this kind of process came close to the study of emotions and 
their role in the moral statements which are transmitted down through 
successive generations.21 Creativity does not make constraints redundant; 
rather, it complements them. Individual intelligence (understanding, 
analysis) and collective intelligence (sharing, collaboration) are able to 
make progress in deciphering the constraints which are binding in human 
interaction, and which partially structure the latter. Thus, the limits of 
information and its treatment, the limitation of the ability to get a clear 
mind about the best available reasons, the difficulties which are specific to 
the constitution of collective actions represent real challenges for human 
action in society. Taking such constraints into account has become a 
major issue in the contemporary world, owing to the growing awareness 
of the necessity to act in consideration of impacts and liabilities which 
far exceed responsibilities which are firmly established in the institutional 
and normative logic. Important examples can be found in the actions we 
20. Bergson wrote: “[…] créateur par excellence est celui dont l’action, intense elle-
même, est capable d’intensifier aussi l’action des autres hommes et d’allumer, généreuse, 
des foyers de générosité ” (Bergson 2009b, 25). See, on these matters Amalric (2012). On 
the cognitive side of the problematic, this interesting aspect of Bergsonism could be re-
examined, starting from an examination of the evolution of beliefs among agents who are 
confident in the expertise of one another. On the dynamic aspects, see Lehrer and Wagner 
(1981, esp. I, ch. 4, §2). A critical discussion of the global perspectives on ethical attitudes 
in contemporary political theory can be found in Küng (2002, 122-133). 
21. See ch. 1 about moral obligation (Bergson 2013a, 47). The comparison between the 
Stoa and Christianity, and the subsequent evocation of Socrates, are good illustrations of 
the interplay of emotions and moral outlooks (Bergson 2013a, 59 sq.).
132 Bergsoniana N°1 | 2021
(sometimes) take to limit global warming, or to avoid alignment on the 
worst options with respect to environmental and social issues, in spite of 
the predominant logic of competitive relocations of industrial activities and 
tax payment. There is also a fundamental link between the recognition of 
constraints, the justification of the forms of collective organisation and the 
understanding of the opportunities for agreement or collaboration. This 
accounts for the continued — indeed, renewed — influence of classical 
contractarian political theory in applied reasonings about collective or 
institutional responsibility, and about constructive decision-making with 
a plurality of stakeholders. For these different reasons, in order to be able 
to think collective action, one needs to take into account the dimension 
of the choice at the level of representations, descriptions and conscious 
build-up of attitudes. I suggest that this can be implemented as indicated 
by the first essay in Mind-Energy. Taking the remembrance of past actions 
into account and learning from past results lies at the heart of choice and 
expectations, as described by Bergson in a precise way.22 Clearly enough, 
such operations are integral parts of collective tasks in response to evolving 
ideas about responsibility-taking. 
Solidarity, Fraternity and Duration in Society
Locating the individual use of reason within the collective also matters to 
address solidarity in a relevant way. Bergson was a thinker of the transition 
from solidarity (as consolidated in the “first morality”) to the ideals of 
fraternity (at the heart of a second morality). But how can we make sure 
that fraternity does not remain trapped in a purely declarative posture, 
and instead inspires institutions that are really capable of exploring the 
practical realities of solidarity? Again, this is a challenge we are faced with 
in contemporary social philosophy. Its relevance for practical matters is 
connected with the way value-laden individual efforts take on a social 
dimension through the action of institutions; as Raymond Ruyer stressed, 
this transformation is key to increased effective power in human action, with 
all the lateral risks for the “authenticity” of results (Ruyer 1948, 81). From 
a Bergsonian viewpoint, it is necessary to articulate the naturalness of the 
individual and the group to the social destination of humanity. Is Bergson 
better than Léon Bourgeois on this score (bearing in mind how Bourgeois 
22. “[…] si, comme nous le disions, la conscience retient le passé et anticipe l’avenir, c’est 
précisément, sans doute, parce qu’elle est appelée à effectuer un choix : pour choisir, il faut 
penser à ce qu’on pourra faire et se remémorer les conséquences, avantageuses ou nuisibles, 
de ce qu’on a déjà fait ; il faut prévoir et il faut se souvenir” (Bergson 2009b, 10). 
Bergson and Our Understanding of Interaction… 133
was successfully criticised by Ferdinand Buisson in this respect)? Bergson 
was unquestionably able to distinguish between necessity and freedom, 
and he did so in a way that proved useful for the collective treatment 
of individual creativity in society, as can be seen in Mind-Energy (first 
essay), where he examined how societies are tentatively giving individuals 
a role within the collective, while putting individual energies together 
and allowing separate efforts jointly to be eased (Bergson 2009b, 25-
26). He later dealt with contradictions and antagonisms among societies, 
but here, Bergson further expressed a distinctive and interesting concern 
for the integrity of the will. He stressed, in a way reminiscent of Kant’s 
views, the compatibility of antagonism with the mutual adjustment of 
individual wills, or even entire societies, within larger communities. Again, 
this kind of process was supposed to nurture creativity in the ordinary 
sense (with its components of invention and effort). Bergson was able 
to give individual intelligence a role in the collective movement without 
omitting the limitations of each individual’s point of view, especially in 
the “first morality,” which is typically elaborated by and for small groups 
(Bergson 2013b, ch.  1). The resulting picture of human life is rather 
complex, since hostility between groups turns out to be associated with 
the gradual alleviation of constraints in human life, and the threats posed 
by intelligence to community life. In The Two Sources, Bergson emphasised 
in a particularly clear way the part of freedom and that of convention, the 
role of the free choice of representations which is allied to constraints when 
it comes to addressing the issue of responsibility with regard to a definite 
and recognised interest. This enabled the author to formulate important 
insights about the complexity of responsibility, which originates in real-
world solidarity, a good distance from the abstract, deceptively simple 
model of independent individual activity (Bergson 2013b, 127-129). 
Collective action and society itself are meant to be viable over time in 
some sense, or “sustainable” in our contemporary jargon. From this point 
of view, I suggest that part of Bergson’s interesting legacy can be found in 
economist Michel Vaté’s considerations about the revelation of duration 
by the collective. His contribution stressed the predominance of duration 
over time whenever we are interested in the social dimension of human 
action, which inevitably relies on the continued existence and development 
of groups. In a theory of the derived existence of institutions, Vaté also 
portrayed institutions as vehicles of collective acts and commitments (Vaté 
1976, especially 29 and 57-58).
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Conclusion
The legacy of Bergson’s philosophy in connection with collective thinking 
about the collective side of human life and action is well worth investigating. 
In this philosophy, it can be observed that creativity, responsibilities and 
mutual responsiveness in social interaction, as well as the awareness of shared 
representations and interpretations, make for a highly interconnected set 
of notions, which can be useful to make progress in the grasp of collective 
action problems. The spiritual interpretation of evolution that Bergson put 
forward enabled him to connect consciousness, choice and intelligence 
with the momentum of social life. This gives a distinctive interest to 
his classic works in addition to the otherwise significant connections 
between his work and the philosophical and scientific ideas of his time. 
Bergson’s views about the kind of progress which infuses social life is still 
inspiring and it challenges the impoverishing perspectives which follow 
from narrow assumptions about pre-determined values, attitudes or 
preferences. Working with a broad, inclusive concept of society, Bergson 
was able to highlight some of the features of action and deliberation which 
have become essential nodes — both methodologically and practically 
— in the network of contemporary perplexities and efforts which relate 
to responsible initiative and planned collective action. Reassessing the 
permanent value of important Bergsonian insights might thus bring light 
to a number of perplexing issues which affect substantial debates in our 
times and, more often than not, hinder collective progress.
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***
Abstract: Bergson’s work is full of insights of the highest interest about motives which 
connect human beings to social norms and the collective. Revisiting Bergson is motivated 
by the fact that we are confronted with many challenges which relate to the transition 
from the individual will to the collective or social will. It is reasonable to think that 
the examination of these challenges may benefit from the renewed reading of an author 
who has examined this transition with particular acuteness. Bergson was the critic of 
the plasticity lent to instinct, but also the critic of the limits of intelligence, given the 
importance of instinct and its derivatives for the stability of social organisation. This 
is a singular argumentative position. Amalgamating the constraints on individual and 
collective intelligence, Bergson understood that social organisation is not transparent for 
thought. The resulting perspective on the collective is well worth a new assessment. In 
particular, turning to this philosophy of evolution and openness might prove important 
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for contemporary developments which aim at reaching a better understanding of the 
virtualities of jointly evolving preferences or value judgments in society, thus escaping a 
number of collective-action shortcomings associated with the assignment of pre-defined 
preferences to individuals.
Keywords: Henri Bergson, collectivity, individuality, norms, organisation.
Mots-clés : L’œuvre de Bergson regorge d’idées du plus haut intérêt sur les motivations 
qui lient les êtres humains aux normes sociales et au collectif. Revisiter Bergson est motivé 
par le fait que nous sommes confrontés à de nombreux défis liés au passage de la volonté 
individuelle à la volonté collective ou sociale. Il est raisonnable de penser que l’examen de 
ces défis peut bénéficier de la lecture renouvelée d’un auteur qui a examiné cette transition 
avec une acuité particulière. Bergson a été le critique de la plasticité prêtée à l’instinct, 
mais aussi le critique des limites de l’intelligence, étant donné l’importance de l’instinct 
et de ses dérivés pour la stabilité de l’organisation sociale. Il s’agit là d’une position 
argumentative singulière. En fusionnant les contraintes de l’intelligence individuelle et 
collective, Bergson a compris que l’organisation sociale n’est pas transparente pour la 
pensée. La perspective sur le collectif qui en résulte mérite bien une nouvelle évaluation. En 
particulier, le recours à cette philosophie de l’évolution et de l’ouverture pourrait s’avérer 
important pour les développements contemporains qui visent à mieux comprendre les 
virtualités des préférences ou des jugements de valeur évoluant conjointement dans la 
société, échappant ainsi à un certain nombre de défauts de l’action collective associés à 
l’attribution de préférences prédéfinies aux individus.
Mots-clés : Henri Bergson, collectivité, individualité, normes, organisation.

